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The ‘Standard of Civilization’ in International Law: 
Intellectual Perspectives from Pre-War Japan

 
 
Mohammad Shahabuddin

 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper establishes the normative connection between Japan’s responses to regional 
hegemonic order prior to the nineteenth century and its subsequent engagement with the 
European standard of civilization. I argue that the Japanese understanding of the 
‘standard of civilization’ in the nineteenth century was informed by the historical pattern 
of its responses to hegemony and the discourse on cultural superiority in the Far East that 
shifted from Sinocentrism to the unbroken Imperial lineage to the national-spirit. 
Although Japanese scholars accepted and engaged with the European standard of 
civilization after the forced opening up of Japan to the Western world in the mid-
nineteenth century, they did so for instrumental purposes and soon translated 
‘civilization’ into a language of imperialism to reassert supremacy in the region. Through 
intellectual historiography, this narrative contextualizes Japan’s engagement with the 
European standard of civilization, and offers an analytical framework not only to go 
beyond Eurocentrism but also to identify various other loci of hegemony, which are 
connected through the same language of power.  
 
 
Key words 
History and theory of international law, standard of civilization; imperialism; 
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While the facts of the past are – to the degree that we can be objective about them – 
independent of our subjective preferences, the names and labels under which we organize 
these facts and plot our narratives cannot claim such objectivity. They are indicative of the 
judgments we make. … Such judgments are inescapable in writing history.
1
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The standard history of the modernization of Japan and its ensuing semi-civilized status starts 
with the gunships of Commodore Matthew Perry, who was sent to Japan in 1853 by US 
President Millard Fillmore with a view to compelling Japan to open diplomatic relations 
between the two countries.
2
 Perry secured the Treaty of Peace and Amity
3
  in the same year 
without in fact using his cannons, paving the diplomatic way for US Consul General 
Townsend Harris to visit Japan in 1856. After a difficult negotiation, Harris concluded the 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with clauses on extraterritoriality, unilateral most-
favoured-nation treatment and restrictions on tariff autonomy. These treaties would become 
known as ‘unequal treaties’. In his negotiations, Harris frequently supported his demands with 
reference to various provisions of the law of nations; his Japanese counterparts hardly knew 
what he was referring to.
4
 It is, therefore, no surprise that any history of international law in 
Japan begins with these nineteenth-century European encounters. Although there is thick 
literature on the ‘pre-modern’ international order in the Far East,5 the normative connection 
between Japan’s various responses to this order, on the one hand, and its engagement with the 
                                                          
1
 D. Chakrabarty, ‘The Muddle of Modernity’, 116 The American Historical Review, no. 3 (2011) at 672. 
2
 See, for example, S. Kuriyama, ‘Historical Aspects of the Progress of International Law in Japan’, 1 Japan 
Annual of International Law (1957), at 1. 
3
 Ibid., at 1. This treaty was soon followed by similar treaties with Britain in 1854, and Russia in 1855. 
4
 M. E. Cosenza (ed.), The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris (1930), at 507-513. 
5
 See, for example, Y. Onuma, ‘When Was the Law of International Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective’, 2 Journal of the History of International Law (2000), 
at 1–66; Y. Onuma, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law: Questioning Prevalent Cognitive 
Frameworks in the Emerging Multi-polar and Multi-civilizational World of the Twenty-first Century (2010); S. 
Yamauchi, ‘Civilization and International Law in Japan during the Meiji Era (1868-1912)’, 24 Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Law and Politics, no. 2 (1996), at 1-25; M. Yanagihara, ‘Introduction: The Role of Prominent Jurists 
in Japan’s Engagement with International Law, 1853–1945’, 56 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 
(2013), at 95-121; M.  Yanagihara, ‘Japan’s Engagement with and Use of International Law, 1853–1945’, in H. 
Steiger and T. Marauhn (eds), Universality and Continuity in International Law (2011), at 447-470; M.  
Yanagihara, ‘Japan’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law (2012), at 475-499; K. Akashi, ‘Japan-Europe’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law (2012), at 724-743; K. Akashi, ‘Japanese “Acceptance” of the European Law 
of Nations: A Brief History of International Law in Japan c. 1853–1900’, in M. Stolleis and M. Yanagihara 
(eds), East Asian and European Perspectives on International Law (2004), at 1-21; S. Kuriyama, ‘Historical 
Aspects of the Progress of International Law in Japan’, 1 Japan Annual of International Law (1957), at 1-5; T. 
Kanae, ‘Japan’s Early Practice of International Law in Fixing Its Territorial Limits’, 22 Japanese Annual of 
International Law (1978), at 1-20; H. Lam, ‘Learning the New Law, Envisioning the New World: Meiji Japan’s 
Reading of Henry Wheaton’, 56 Japanese Yearbook of International Law (2013), at 4-36; H. Otsuka, ‘Japan’s 
Early Encounter with the Concept of the “Law of Nations”’, 13 Japanese Annual of International Law (1969), at 
35-65; F. Ito, ‘One Hundred Years of International Law Studies in Japan’, 13 Japanese Annual of International 
Law (1969), at 19-34; K. Lee, ‘The ‘Reception’ of European International Law in China, Japan and Korea: A 
Comparative and Critical Perspective’, in H. Steiger and T. Marauhn (eds), Universality and Continuity in 
International Law (2011), at 419-446. 
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nineteenth-century European notion of the standard of civilization, on the other, is not 
adequately spelled out. 
This paper addresses this gap. I demonstrate that what appears as a straightforward 
application of European international law and the standard of civilization in Japan’s late-
nineteenth century imperial projects was in fact shaped by a long-standing process of Japan’s 
historical engagement with a system of cultural hierarchy in the regional order. The Japanese 
understanding of the standard of civilization in the nineteenth century was informed by the 
historical pattern of its responses to hegemony and the discourse on cultural superiority in the 
Far East that shifted from Sinocentrism to Japan’s uniquely unbroken Imperial lineage to the 
notion of national-spirit (kokutai). Although Japanese scholars accepted and engaged with the 
European standard of civilization after the forced opening up of Japan to the Western world in 
the mid-nineteenth century, they did so for instrumental purposes and translated ‘civilization’ 
into a language of imperialism to reassert supremacy in the region.  
The notion of ‘civilization’ adopted different meanings at different junctures of 
history.
6
  Given that ‘civilization’, as a political language of power, has always been external 
to the ordinary ways of living in any society and, therefore, an elite construction, here I 
refrain from venturing into depicting any ‘true meaning’ of civilization. 7  Instead, my 
argument is that the Japanese discourse on cultural superiority historically engaged with 
dominant ideologies and deconstructed them to assert Japanese superiority – practices that 
date back to long before the European encounters in the nineteenth century.  
Therefore, to properly appreciate Japan’s emergence as an imperial power in the Far 
Eastern regional order, its military aggression in successive World Wars, and the role of 
international law in such imperial projects – all using the European language of the standard 
of civilization,
8
 it is imperative to understand Japan’s pre-modern engagements and responses 
to various hegemonic orders defined by the notion of cultural superiority. This is neither to 
claim any causal or linear relationship between various pre-war Japanese ideologies and 
Japan’s late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialism,9 nor to argue that Japan’s 
imperialism vis-à-vis its Asian neighbours was the product of any particular aspect of 
Japanese culture. Instead, this paper highlights the structure within which Japan constantly 
engaged with, challenged, and deconstructed the dominant ideas in various pre-war epochs 
and the way such engagements offer a useful framework to understand Japan’s encounter 
with the nineteenth-century European notion of the standard of civilization.  
This contextualization of Japanese encounter with the European notion of the standard 
of civilization, thus, offers an analytical framework not only to go beyond Eurocentrism in 
critiquing international law and its imperial projects but also to identify various other systems 
of hegemony and the way they engaged with European imperialism. The dynamic process of 
                                                          
6
 For a detailed discussion on the evolution of the concept of ‘civilization’, see L. O. Tarazona, ‘The Civilized 
and the Uncivilized’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International 
Law (2012), at 917-942.  
7
 Cf. G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (1984); Schwarzenberger, ‘The 
Standard of Civilization in International Law’, 17 Current Legal Problems (1955), at 212-34. See also, Duara, 
‘The Discourse of Civilisation and Pan-Asianism’, 12 Journal of World History, no. 1 (2001), at 99.  
8
 Note that during the interwar period, Japanese foreign policies gradually moved towards pan-Asianism (Asia-
shugi), but the underlying notion of ‘civilizing mission’ continued to justify Japan’s leadership role in Asia.  
9
 Although such connections are commonly made. See, for example, M. Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in 
Modern Japanese Politics, ed. and trans. I. Morris (1969 [1963]). 
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crafting new norms of domination as ‘civilization’ in the regional hegemonic order is also 
highlighted in the process. Far from being blotted out by the European standard of 
civilization imposed through colonization or imperialism, the regional hegemonic systems 
continued to translate the notion of ‘civilization’ into local contexts, for the same imperial 
purposes. In this sense, the narrative of the standard of civilization in international law from 
Japanese intellectual perspectives offers a framework for further research into other pre-
colonial regional orders to examine ways in which the structures of those orders inform 
present-day regional asymmetric power relations. Here lies the general normative relevance 
of this project beyond the specific context of Japan. 
 
  
2. JAPAN’S NORMATIVE RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIC POWER 
RELATIONS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Engagements with the Middle Kingdom  
 
In Confucian philosophy, the ruler is the only son of heaven, with heaven’s mandate to lead 
the people of the world, and the centre of civilization for all humanity.
10
 Rulers throughout 
the world must therefore obey the Chinese emperor.
11
 However, given that the emperor’s 
influence in reality had certain geographical limits, people outside the sphere of such 
influence were known as ‘barbarians’ (yidi in Chinese or iteki in Japanese) in contrast to the 
‘central flowering’ (zhonghwa in Chinese or chuuka in Japanese) of Chinese culture.12 As 
Yasuaki Onuma demonstrates, there was no question of equality between the emperor and 
other rulers: all relations were subject to rules, customs and rituals set by the Middle 
Kingdom, not to treaties between the parties.
13
 Rulers in other jurisdictions could not 
designate themselves as emperor, though some did so domestically.
14
 
Confucianism was introduced to Japan in the fifth century
15
 and with it came the 
Sinocentric tribute system.
16
 China – the home of Confucianism – was seen as not only far 
more powerful than Japan but also superior in the realm of thought and institutions, which 
were therefore imported to Japan.
17
 Their shared history went back further: the Chinese 
dynastic history Wei Zhi (ca. 297), had a discussion on the ‘Wa people’ (the Japanese) in the 
section ‘Dongyi zhuan’ (‘Accounts of the Eastern Barbarians’).18 Successive rulers of Japan, 
                                                          
10
 H. Watanabe, A History of Japanese Political Thought 1600 –1901, trans. David Noble (2012 [2010]), at 24. 
11
 Onuma, supra note 5, at 12. See also, Masaharu Yanagihara, ‘Japan’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012), at 476-477. 
12
 Watanabe, supra note 10, at 25.  
13
 Onuma, supra note 5, at 12. 
14
 Ibid., at 17. 
15
 W. Zhang, Fukuzawa Yukichi: The Pioneer of East Asia’s Westernization with Ancient Confucianism (2010), 
at 26. 
16
 Onuma, ‘“Japanese International Law” in the Pre-war period – Perspectives on the Teaching and Research of 
International Law in Pre-war Japan’, 29 The Japanese Annual of International Law (1986), at 23-24. 
17
 Ibid., at 24. 
18
 R. Tsunoda and L. C.  Goodrich, trans. ‘History of the Kingdom of Wei (Wei zhi) ca. 297 C.E.’, in W. T. de 
Barry, D. Keene, G. Tanabe and P. Varley (eds), Sources of Japanese Tradition, 2
nd
 edn, vol. I (2001), at 6-8. 
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appointed by the Chinese ruler, paid tribute to China in order to strengthen and sanctify their 
authority.
19
 Contemporary Japanese scholars accepted this subordinate position as a crude, if 
uncomfortable, reality. Satoo Naokata (1650–1719) wrote: ‘Perhaps the appellation of 
barbarian is not one to be welcomed with pride or joy, but if one is born in a barbarian land, 
there is little that can be done.’20  
 Nevertheless, in the seventh century, Japanese rulers began to challenge the notion of 
Chinese superiority, albeit for domestic political convenience. An official letter from the 
Japanese government to the Chinese Emperor Yang-ti of the Sui dynasty addressed him as 
‘the Son of Heaven (tianzi) of the country where the sun sets’ while referring to the Japanese 
emperor as ‘the Son of Heaven of the country where the sun rises’. 21  As Masaharu 
Yanagihara notes, this letter angered the Chinese emperor, who by custom should be the only 
Son of Heaven.
22
 Also, from the seventh century onward, Japanese rulers refused to be 
appointed by the Chinese emperor. When Yoshimitsu Ashikaga was appointed monarch of 
Japan by the Chinese emperor, the matter was seen rather as an exception; political and 
intellectual elites criticized Ashikaga as being too submissive to China.
23
 
The formal relationship between China and Japan ended in the middle of the sixteenth 
century when Japan demanded equal status in diplomatic relations and China, viewing the 
rest of the world as subordinate, refused.
24
 Japan did, though, accept Confucianism as the 
normative framework for its relations with other neighbouring countries, because it perfectly 
paved the way for Japan to make similar claims against them.
25
 This ‘small-Sinocentrism’ 
initially developed between 502 and 600.
26
 As Kinji Akashi notes, a king of Wa invaded and 
conquered the northern and southern parts of Japan during this period and subordinated the 
local people there to the Wa people, so that ‘the king of Wa let himself be at the conceptual 
center of the Japanese styled Sinocentric order’.27 Similarly, Japan claimed superiority over 
Korea, premised on Japan’s equality with China and Korea’s tributary position with respect 
to China.
28
 Korean authorities never recognized the Japanese claim of superiority, demanding 
at least equal treatment in diplomatic relations.
29
  
 Another peripheral entity of the Sinocentric system was the Ryukyu Kingdom, the 
present-day Okinawa prefecture.
30
 Japan developed an active trade relationship with Ryukyu 
in the early fifteenth century, and the King of Ryukyu occasionally sent gifts to the Ashikaga 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See also, R. Tsunoda and L. C. Goodrich, Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories: Later Han through Ming 
Dynasties (1851). 
19
 Onuma, supra note 16, at 24. 
20
 Satoo Naokata, Chuugoku ronshuu, quoted in Watanabe, supra note 10, at 279. 
21
 See, Onuma, supra note 5, at 13. Also, Yanagihara, supra note 14, at 475. 
22
 Yanagihara, supra note 11, at 475. 
23
 Onuma, supra note 16, at 24, 26. 
24
 Ibid., at 24. 
25
 Ibid., at 26. 
26
 See, K. Akashi, ‘Japan-Europe’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (2012), at 727. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Onuma, supra note 16, at 24-25. 
29
 Ibid., at 25. 
30
 For a debate on whether Ryukyu should be treated as an ikoku (foreign land) or iiki (fringe land but not a 
domestic area) from Japanese perspectives, see Yanagihara, supra note 11, at 479-480. 
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Shogun, who considered these gifts tribute.
31
 As Ashikaga’s power declined and a bloody 
civil war ensued, Ryukyu missions to the Shogunate ended. When Hideyoshi Toyotomi 
reunified the nation, the Ryukyuan king congratulated him but ignored his order to join the 
Japanese military campaign against Korea.
32
 The Shimazu family, the local feudal lord of the 
Satsuma clan in southern Kyushu who controlled Japan’s trade relations with Ryukyu and 
Korea, took advantage of the disobedience to take military measures against Ryukyu.
33
 With 
the authorization of the succeeding Tokugawa Shogunate in 1609, the Satsuma clan 
dispatched troops to Okinawa. The king surrendered, swore allegiance to the Lord of 
Satsuma, and accepted Satsuma’s control over the Ryukyuan economy.34 To avoid direct 
confrontation with China, Japan officially kept Ryukyu independent, but in practice 
successive kings of Ryukyu were ‘allowed to rule their state only in accordance with 
Satsuma’s direction and under the strict supervision of its inspectors’.35 
 Despite the practical relevance of Confucianism, Tokugawa rulers saw its demand for 
morality-based rule as a potential threat to their entire social and political order, which was 
based on hereditary status and military might.
36
 As Ekiken Kaibara wrote, ‘[i]f one adopted 
the Chinese way, it would be difficult to conduct warfare in the Japanese manner. Japan is a 
martial nation; it would be impossible to triumph here following the undissembling and soft 
customs of the Chinese, for those are not the customs of Japan.’37 Many scholars in the early 
eighteenth century agreed, believing that the samurai have the way of the samurai, which is 
appropriate for Japan. The Way of the sages of a foreign land, i.e., China, would not be.
38
 
Although some Japanese Confucians, such as Nakae Tooju (1608–48), Itoo Jinsai 
(1627–1705), and Ogyuu Sorai (1666–1728), attempted to reconcile Confucianism with 
Japanese military custom,
39
 a more fundamental claim came from the military affairs scholar 
Yamaga Sokoo (1622–85), who argued that the real world and scholarship are two different 
things: the purpose of the ‘sacred teachings’ was to ‘enable samurai and their leaders to learn 
the patterns of behaviour and skills needed in their daily life as warriors, so that they could 
achieve victory and success’.40 Excelling in martial arts is the raison d'état for practising 
Confucianism; by implication, ‘a warrior would have mastered the “sacred teaching” if he 
                                                          
31
 T. Kanae, ‘Japan’s Early Practice of International Law in Fixing Its Territorial Limits’, 22 The Japanese 
Annual of International Law (1978), at 13. See also, Akashi, supra note 26, at 727-728. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 R. I. Hellyer, Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868 (2009), at 1. 
34
 Kanae, supra note 31, at 13. 
35
 Ibid. However, Yanagihara notes that the status of Ryukyu in relation to Tokugawa Japan remains an 
unresolved issue among Japanese historians. See, Yanagihara, supra note 11, at 482-483.  
36
 Watanabe, supra note 10, at 86-88. See also, Zhang, supra note 15, at 27. 
37
 Ekiken Kaibara, Bukun (Military Lessons), 1716, quoted in Watanabe, supra note 10, at 89. Kaibara died in 
1714 and Bukun was published posthumously by his disciple Takeda Shunan (1661-1745). 
38
 For example, the military scholar Tsugaru Koodoo (1682–1729) openly advocated ‘military rule’ as opposed 
to the ‘moral rule’ of the Confucians, arguing that foreign lands are ruled by ‘cultural virtues’, while Japan, 
because of its topography and the character of its soil and water, is ruled by ‘military virtues’. See, Tsugaru 
Koodoo, Buji teiyoo, cited in Watanabe, supra note 10, at 96. Others rejected the relevance and utility of archaic, 
foreign teachings to Japanese governance. Matsudaira Nobutsuna (1596–1662), for example, suggested ignoring 
classic Confucian texts in favour of the stratagems of Tokugawa Leyasu (Gongen-sama) and of men who know 
the laws handed down by the Tokugawa regime. See, Ooshima Toyonaga, Nobutsuna ki, cited in Watanabe, 
supra note 10, at 79. 
39
 For a detailed account, see, Watanabe, supra note 10 at 89-90, 103, 106-118, 125, 161-164. See also, Zhang, 
supra note 15, at 26-28.  
40
 Yamaga Sokoo, Haisho zanpitsu, cited in Watanabe, supra note 10, at 90.  
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gained the military and tactical knowledge required to perform his duties’.41 It follows that 
Japan, being a martial nation, has also acquired the necessary degree of Confucian 
civilization. Indeed, Sokoo at one point claimed that ‘Japan was actually the centre of the 
world and perforce possessed from the beginning the essence of the Way spoken of by the 
Confucians’, and ‘even if it wasn’t exactly in accordance with the Confucian teachings, it was 
fine for Japan to do things in its own way, nor should it feel inferior to China’.42 
Thus, by the seventeenth century, Japan not only challenged China’s position as the 
centre of the universe but was openly questioning the superiority of Confucianism. As we 
shall see in the following section, Japanese scholars soon developed a new meaning of 
cultural supremacy that broke with Chinese ideological hegemony for the first time in many 
centuries. 
 
2.2. The Divine Kingdom and the new sense of superiority 
 
The resistance of the Japanese intelligentsia to the notion of ‘Middle Kingdom’ based on 
Confucian ideology entered a new phase with the emergence of National Learning or 
Kokugaku. The Kokugaku attack on Confucianism, as Masao Maruyama notes, was 
paradoxically facilitated by the Confucian scholar Sorai’s methodology and critique of Neo-
Confucian thoughts.
43
 For some time, Japanese Confucians tried to contextualize 
Confucianism within the Japanese culture and, thereby, reconcile Confucianism with an 
emerging sense of national pride. However, beginning in the seventeenth century, the 
already-fragile foundation of Confucianism in the Japanese society began to collapse before 
more nationalist ideology primarily based on the ancient Japanese Way of the Divine 
Kingdom and the unbroken lineage of the Imperial family. Kokugaku criticized the Confucian 
worldview as ‘too normative oriented, too oppressive to human emotions and sentiments, and 
too submissive to China’.44 Kokugaku scholars such as Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843) claimed 
that Japan’s unbroken Imperial line (bansei ikkei) demonstrated that this island empire was 
the ‘Land of Gods’. This made Japan the Middle Kingdom and superior to China, where 
dynastic changes and ‘Tartar rule’ were frequent,45 and laid the foundation for Japan’s claim 
to leadership in Asia.  
 Long before this, Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293–1354) had explained Japan’s unique 
position as a ‘divine country’ in his A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns (Jinnoo Shootooki): 
‘The heavenly ancestor it was who first laid its foundations, and the Sun Goddess left her 
descendants to reign over it forever and ever. This is true only of our country, and nothing 
similar may be found in foreign lands.’46 But after the mid-seventeenth century the concept of 
the divine realm and the ‘ancient Way’ added a political meaning, as a source of Japan’s 
superiority vis-à-vis China. For example, according to Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), the 
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 Watanabe, supra note 10, at 90. 
42
 Yamaga Sokoo, Chuuchoo jujitsu, cited in Watanabe, supra note 10, 90–91.  
43
 See generally, M.  Maruyama, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, translated by Mikiso 
Hane (Princeton: Princeton University Press/ Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974). 
44
 Onuma, supra note 16, at 26. 
45
 S.  Saaler, ‘Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History’, in S. Saaler and J. V. Koschmann (eds), Pan-
Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (2007), at 3. 
46
 K. Chikafusa, A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns, trans. H. Paul Varley (1980), at 49. 
8 
 
ancient Way signified the great and honourable customs of august Japan and comprised all 
aspects of human living of the age of the gods and the first legendary emperors of Japan.
47
 
Norinaga asserted that the early emperors governed by the ancient Way of the gods, and 
made decisions by inquiring ‘after the minds of the gods through divination. In no matters did 
[they] rely on the wisdom of [their] intellect; this is the true Way and the correct manner of 
acting.’48 This was a drastic deviation from the Confucian reliance on the virtue of the ruler, 
and the emperor’s officials and the general population followed his example: ‘They all 
respected the imperial court, and faithfully observed the regulations that came from above. 
They did not in the least try to rely on their own rational intellect, and so both high and low 
were in harmony and the government of the empire flourished.’49    
 To Norinaga’s chagrin, the Confucian teachings imported from China overshadowed 
the ancient Way of managing state affairs, and rationality and individual thinking gradually 
permeated public opinion. Norinaga blamed Japan’s fall from grace into corruption and 
degradation on the spread of Confucian thought and ‘Sinicization’ in contemporary society,50 
and ‘in the end, there was no difference at all between the evil customs of the Chinese 
barbarians and our own’.51 Confucian scholars, such as Sorai and Dazai, naturally came under 
his harsh criticism in this regard:  
[T]hese men deemed it wise to speak as if China alone were worthy of respect, to claim that it is 
superior in all things, and to hold our imperial land in extremely low regard, insisting that it is a 
barbarous country. … Although they too were fortunate enough to have been born in this Imperial land 
and to have been exposed to the scripture of the [Japanese Shinto] Gods … they failed to comprehend 
and realize that the Way of the Gods [Shinto] is superior to the Ways of foreign lands, and that it is 
truly the grand and just Way. They even disparaged and villified it. What could they have been 
thinking of?
52 
Maruyama argues that this criticism of Sorai is not completely just, for he never called China 
the ‘most superior land’, but there is no denying that the Sorai School’s views on Shintoism 
served to mediate negatively between it and National Learning.
53
 
For Norinaga, the essential reason Chinese Confucian learning was incompatible with 
the Japanese Way was Confucianism’s underlying assumption about the source of legitimacy 
of power. A Confucian ruler is to be obeyed because of his virtue and correctness; eventually 
someone will usurp the throne, asserting that he himself is correct and virtuous. With this 
analogy, Norinaga concluded that ‘the Way in China is nothing but devices to seize someone 
else’s country, and schemes to protect it from being seized’,54 characterizing the Confucian 
sages as mere rebels.
55
 By Norinaga’s time, China had already experienced repeated 
overthrowing of imperial rules, and was then ruled by the non-Chinese, nomadic Manchus of 
the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Japan’s continued loyalty to the emperor was unique and 
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became a common reference point even in novels to mark the cultural superiority of Japan 
over China.
56
 
By this logic, the uniqueness of the Japanese Imperial continuity and its resultant 
superiority over China resided in its culture of loyalty towards the emperor irrespective of his 
virtue: ‘no matter how virtuous the people below him may be, they cannot replace him, and 
thus the distinction between sovereign and subject is firmly and immutably fixed for tens and 
hundreds of thousands of years to come, until the end of time.’ 57  Confucianism was 
irrelevant; Japan’s claim to superiority was based on the eternal unbroken Imperial lineage. 
Given that Japanese superiority was based on its own ancient Way, Norinaga had no 
difficulty in seeing this as the universal standard.  This ancient Way, for him, was ‘the Way 
of mankind’ – a model for the entire human race: ‘Extending over Heaven and Earth, the true 
Way is the same in every single country, but it has been transmitted correctly in our Imperial 
Land alone. In other countries, its transmission was already lost in ancient times.’58 Whereas 
the Neo-Confucian scholar Asami Keisai (1652–1715) argued that one’s own country is 
always the Middle Kingdom and other countries are the ‘barbarians’, thus Japan was the 
Middle Kingdom regardless of any standard of superiority or inferiority,
59
 Norinaga believed 
in the inherent superiority of the Japanese Way beyond cultural relativism. Norinaga held that 
if one truly believed in the teachings of the imperial land (Kookoku, i.e., Japan), then one 
should also accept that the teachings of other lands are indisputably false, hence people from 
there should also believe in the teachings of the imperial land.
60
 In his words: ‘our country is 
the land where the Sun Goddess originated, and where her imperial line still reigns. It is the 
source and foundation of all countries, and all other countries should honour Japan and 
submit to it; this would be in accordance with the true Way.’61 Hiroshi Watanabe asserts that 
from the late Tokugawa period until 1945, the phrase ‘imperial land’, which Norinaga coined, 
was accepted and used in almost every political persuasion, for it symbolized a sense of 
‘national pride, an assertion of Japan’s unique character as a nation ruled by an unbroken 
lineage of emperors since the farthest reaches of antiquity’.62    
The immense popularity of Kokogaku thinkers such as Norinaga deeply influenced 
the pro-Imperial Mito School of Confucianism and compelled them to rethink Confucian 
learning. As a result, Mito scholars in reviving Confucian moral culture not only infused 
elements of Kokugaku myth but also asserted that Japan’s native Way was primary and 
esteemed Chinese moral norms were merely a supplement.
63
 
 
2.3. ‘National-spirit’ to resist Christian invasion 
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Mito scholars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century encountered a more drastic 
force – early signs of European imperialism. With the arrival of new technologies and the 
improved knowledge of world geography supplied by Western learning, most assumptions of 
the Sinocentric world order were dispelled. As Tadashi Wakabayashi notes, Japanese thinkers 
in all traditions welcomed this advanced Western knowledge partly because it discredited 
Chinese claims of cultural superiority,
64
 though its marked superiority suggested a new peril. 
By the early nineteenth century, Mito thinkers, most prominently Seishisai Aizawa (1781–
1863) had to respond to this emerging threat of European imperialism towards Japan. 
Aizawa’s New Theses served mainly as a policy work for the Tokugawa Feudal 
System (Bakufu) to endorse its anti-foreigner policy (Jooi) and prescribe a long-term strategy 
to defend Japan against the imminent threat of European imperialism.
65
 The Bakufu policy of 
expelling foreigners by force emerged in its final form with the Expulsion Edict of 1825, 
which was triggered by the fear of Christianity.
66
 Tokugawa elites were also concerned that 
new international ties would undermine their feudal privileges.
67
 Sharing the Bakufu hatred 
for Europeans and their religion, and suspicion about the Europeans’ aggressive venture, 
Aizawa easily endorsed the expulsion policy. He saw jooi as sweeping away or eradicating 
what is culturally barbarian, ‘an attempt to build barriers between Japanese commoners and 
foreigners’.68 Earlier Mito Confucians stressed the need to edify those commoners to make 
them less susceptible to barbarian transformation; Aizawa and other nineteenth-century Mito 
thinkers advocated adding brute force and hard military action to this moral transformation.
69
 
They saw that Europeans would first win a reputation for benevolence with small acts of 
kindness, capture people’s hearts and minds, propagate Christianity, and having set the 
premise find a convenient moment to conquer those people. ‘Once beguiled by Christianity’, 
he notes, the stupid commoners ‘cannot be brought back to their senses. Herein lies the secret 
of the barbarian’s success.’70 Mito scholars disagreed on various other issues, but the entire 
Mito School shared Aizawa’s suspicion of ‘stupid commoners’.71  
Aizawa’s solution thus went beyond banning Christianity to transforming these 
untrustworthy commoners themselves, through a sense of national-spiritual unification – 
kokutai. While Tokugawa and Ch’ing writers used the term kokutai or kuo t’i to mean ‘the 
nation’s honour’ or ‘dynastic prestige’, Wakabayashi argues that Aizawa’s use in New Theses 
was  significantly different, connoting ‘the unity of religion and government’ used by a ruler 
                                                          
64
 Ibid., at 138. 
65
 However, some foreigners were exempt: ‘four gates’ were held open for international trade. See, H. Lam, 
‘Learning the New Law, Envisioning the New World: Meiji Japan’s Reading of Henry Wheaton’, 56 Japanese 
Yearbook of International Law (2013), at 34-36. 
66
 Note that wholesale seclusion has never been the case; Japan remained diplomatically and commercially 
engaged, especially with neighbouring countries. See, Hellyer, supra note 33, at 6. For a more recent take on 
this subject, see Yanagihara, supra note 11, at 477-481.    
67
 Maruyama, supra note 43, at 352.  
68
 Wakabayashi, supra note 63, at 54. 
69
 S. Aizawa, New Theses (1825), trans. B. T. Wakabayashi in B. T. Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western 
Learning in Early-Modern Japan (1986), at 55. 
70
 Ibid., at 200.  
71
 See, Maruyama, supra note 43, at 355-356. 
11 
 
to create spiritual unity and integration among his subjects and, thereby, transform a people 
into a nation.
72
  
Aizawa believed that the loyalty of subjects for their ruler is the greatest moral 
precept of the cosmos, and affection between parent and child is the ultimate form of blessing 
within the realm. He wrote that these two sentiments ‘exist together between Heaven and 
Earth; they slowly and steadily seep into men’s hearts in all places and ears.’73 The ancient 
sage kings understood and used this loyalty and filial devotion to rule and to uphold nature’s 
moral order among their people. Ever since earth became distinct from the firmament and 
men came into being, a Divine Line of Emperors descended from the Sun Goddess, 
Amaterasu, had ruled Japan, and no one had ever had evil designs on the throne.
74
 This 
demonstrates, in Aizawa’s view, the indivisibility of politics and religion: religious rituals are 
a means of political rule, and political rule is identical to ethical inculcation. The people’s 
allegiances were undivided; they had simply to revere Amaterasu and Her Divine Imperial 
Line to create both spiritual unity among the people and the union of Heaven and men.
75
 
Thus, in New Theses, Aizawa attempted to unite the people with the Divine through a 
purpose-built religion and series of social ceremonies. These would address the prevalent 
lack of spirituality – which could breed Christianity – and renew the commoners’ 
consciousness about their ties to the Divine Land of Amaterasu.  
These currents of thought, Wakabayashi claims, caused ‘the beginnings of national 
consciousness – over and above simple ethnic pride – in nineteenth century Japan’, with New 
Theses, coupled with the government’s policy of expulsion by force, signalling the 
emergence of proto-nationalism in Japan and a shift from the notion of a universal empire 
(i.e., Confucian China) to a nation-state (imperial Japan).
76
 However, the perception of 
international relations remained predominantly hierarchical, in that neither the Confucians 
nor the Kokogaku or Mito scholars accepted a worldview based on the equality of nations.
77
  
  Aizawa’s New Theses lived much beyond his time: some of his ideas regarding the 
central role of religion as a kokutai became Meiji policy.
78
 However, with the change of the 
late Tokugawa rulers’ approach to foreigners in the face of Commodore Perry’s warships and 
with the realization that Japan could not stand the European invasion that would come if it 
did not open up ports for foreign trade,
79
 Aizawa himself discarded the rhetoric of expulsion 
of foreigners after the late 1850s.
80
 In fact, Japan not only opened itself to Europe, but almost 
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totally transformed its state and society, facing new challenges and new notions of 
civilization and its standards, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868.  
The foregoing three examples of Japanese engagements with the dominant ideas of 
the Middle Kingdom, the Divine Kingdom and the ‘national-spirit’ underscore the way Japan 
historically responded to hierarchical systems or imperial powers by constantly challenging 
and deconstructing the dominant ideas and asserting its own cultural superiority. This 
dynamic process of engaging with the regional hegemonic order offered the normative 
structure within which Japan managed, first, its encounter with the European notion of the 
standard of civilization in the nineteenth century and, later on, its imperial relationship with 
Asian neighbours. Against this historical background, in the following section we reflect on 
Japanese engagements with the nineteenth-century European standard of civilization through 
the writing of Fukuzawa.  
 
3. FROM REGIONAL ORDER TO EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: NOW CIVILIZATION IS SELF-DEFENCE 
 
Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835–1901) is one of the most influential intellectuals and social thinkers 
to have emerged from modern Japan. According to one author, he is even depicted as a ‘god’ 
in Japan, paradoxically by those who know little about his significance for nineteenth-century 
cultural, political, and economic history.
81
 In 2013, a special issue of the Japanese Yearbook 
of International Law named Fukuzawa with his ‘marvellous efforts’ as one of ten jurists 
prominent in the reception, improvement or extension of modern European international law 
in Japan in 1853–1945.82 
Fukuzawa was in his mid-thirties when the Meiji Restoration of 1868 dramatically 
transformed Japan’s political system. He was a harsh critic of the Tokugawa feudal system of 
lineage that had prevailed for more than two centuries. Fukuzawa had a deep understanding 
of Chinese learning, Japanese history, and especially Western learning, and believed that ‘the 
future direction of the new Japan would be determined by how the Japanese understood 
Western civilization, and the means by which they maintained balance while adopting from 
it’.83 This belief was reinforced by his travels through Asia to Europe and the US even before 
1868: he saw not only Western ways of life and the vitality and superior development of its 
civilization but also the miserable conditions of European colonies in Asia, such as India. He 
witnessed the fate of a country that lost its independence, and this knowledge and his 
apprehensions for Japan developed into An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, published in 
1875.
84
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 In An Outline, Fukuzawa depicts ‘civilization’ as concerning the development of the 
human spirit and the spiritual development of the people of a nation as a whole.
85
 Beyond 
increasing comfort and luxury, civilization refines knowledge and cultivates virtue, elevating 
human life to a higher plane.
86
 Fukuzawa’s theory of civilization, developed within a liberal 
evolutionary framework, asserted that human societies have to pass through different stages – 
the ‘ages of civilization’.87 Eight years later, Lorimer would classify nations as civilized, 
barbarian, and savage on the basis of the standard of civilization.
88
 However, Fukuzawa’s 
taxonomy curved towards civilization, unlike Lorimer, who now infamously confined the 
operation of international law to only the civilized nations.
89
  
For Fukuzawa, the first stage of human progress is primitivity: men form communal 
groups to ensure their basic needs, but are powerless before the forces of nature. In the next 
stage, semi-developed civilization, men build houses, form communities, conduct largescale 
agricultural activities, and create the outward semblance of a state. And finally, there is the 
stage in which ‘men subsume the things of the universe within a general structure, but the 
structure does not bind them. Their spirits enjoy free play and are not credulous of old 
customs. … They cultivate their own virtue and refine their own knowledge.’90 According to 
Fukuzawa, this is what is meant by modern civilization: a leap far beyond the primitive or 
semi-developed stages.  
Although Fukuzawa explicated the relativity embedded in the concept of civilization, 
he nonetheless acknowledged that the designations ‘civilized’, ‘semi-developed’, and 
‘primitive’ have been universally accepted by  people all over the globe, because ‘the facts 
are demonstrable and irrefutable’.91 Though aware, like some of his contemporary critics of 
Western influence on Japanese culture, of the limitations and vices of European civilization, 
he would not leave Japan with no criteria for civilization by discarding the European 
standard.
92
 Convinced that civilization was evolutionary and Europeans were at its highest 
level to date, Fukuzawa concluded that ‘in all countries of the world, be they primitive or 
semi-developed, those who are to give thought to their country’s progress in civilization must 
necessarily take European civilization as the criterion in making arguments, and must weigh 
the pros and cons of the problem in the light of it.’93 Therefore Western civilization was the 
goal of Japanese progress.   
 However, Fukuzawa understood civilization essentially as a mode of self-defence. In 
an 1874 letter he wrote: ‘My sole aim … is the preservation of our national independence.’94 
He meant preserving ‘national polity’, thought by many to be incompatible with civilization. 
Distinguishing ‘national polity’ from ‘political legitimation’ or ‘blood lineage’, he argued 
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that the world had seen changes of political legitimation that did not change the blood lineage 
or affect national polity. Japan’s centre of power had shifted more than once between the 
Imperial family and the military elites, but this change of political legitimation had never 
changed either the national polity or the blood lineage of the Imperial family. In sharp 
contrast with the Kokugaku and the Mito school, Fukuzawa believed that the essence of a 
nation is not an unbroken line of monarchy, but the preservation of its national polity, 
depending on which both political legitimation and blood lineage will flourish or flounder.
95
 
Therefore, he concludes,   
Now the only duty of the Japanese at present is to preserve Japan’s national polity. For to preserve 
national polity will be to preserve national sovereignty. And in order to preserve national sovereignty 
the intellectual powers of the people must be elevated. There are many factors involved in this, but the 
first order of business in development of our intellectual power lies in sweeping away credulity to past 
customs and adopting the spirit of Western civilization.
96
 
With this shift in understanding of the key indicator of civilization, Fukuzawa not only 
contests the popular suspicion that civilization would hamper Japanese polity, but also 
contextualizes his proposition for internalizing the essence of European civilization within an 
instrumental framework.     
As a corollary of this instrumental approach to civilization, Fukuzawa’s theory 
uniquely localized the liberal universal notion of civilization. As a believer in evolutionary 
science, Fukuzawa saw it as the course of nature for the advanced countries to control the less 
advanced, and thus that Japan’s backwardness compared to European civilization made it 
vulnerable. With backwardness threatening national polity, maintaining Japan’s 
independence was his foremost concern.
97
 
Fukuzawa saw realism as crucial in international affairs, where only two things count 
– in times of peace, trading goods and competing for profits; in times of war, taking up arms. 
In other words, ‘the present world is a world of commerce and warfare’.98 As such, people of 
different nations will be biased in favour of their respective countries. Patriots may not intend 
harm to other countries, but will indeed prioritize their own country’s interest: ‘it is the 
biased, partisan spirit that divides the globe into smaller sections and establishes within each 
section political factions, then calculates what benefits these political factions,’ and therefore, 
‘it is clear that the ethic of impartial and universal brotherhood is not compatible with the 
ethic of patriotism and establishment of national independence’.99 
Using the analogy of the han system of feudal Japan, abolished by the Meiji 
government in 1871, in which each han necessarily put its own interests above that of others, 
he told proponents of universal justice that their first goal should be to abolish national 
governments throughout the world. While there are countries with national governments, 
‘there can be no way to eliminate their self-interests. If there is no way to eliminate their self-
interests, then we too must have our self-interests in any contacts with them. This is why 
partisanship and patriotism differ in name but mean the same thing.’100 As Harry Parkes, 
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British Consul-General in Japan from 1865 to 1882, rightly – though condescendingly – 
noted: ‘To the Meiji mind, international relations in the second half of the nineteenth century 
were based on a predatory system of might. … international law was followed only insofar as 
it benefited a nation to do so and the strong ignored the law when it was to their 
advantage.’101 With this idea of nationally situated partisan spirit, Fukuzawa thus fixed the 
building blocks of his theory of civilization: focus on internal spirit, not external aspects of 
civilization; progress on public knowledge rather than private virtue; and above all, preserve 
the national polity instead of emphasizing political legitimacy or the unbroken Imperial 
lineage. 
Fukuzawa gradually became more radical and realist as Japanese history approached 
critical juncture, and his influence increased proportionately. Three years after the publication 
of An Outline Fukuzawa declared that the failure of Japanese efforts to renegotiate unequal 
treaties in the light of their modernization was irrelevant; even if the European powers had 
agreed, such treaties could have no genuine impact.
102
 In the real world, nations gain 
advantage from their might, not their rational claims: ‘A few cannons are worth more than a 
hundred volumes of international law. A case of ammunition is of more use than innumerable 
treaties of friendship … There are only two ways in international relations: to destroy, or to 
be destroyed.’103 In the following year, he added: ‘A nation does not come out on top because 
it is in the right. It is right because it has come out on top.’104 In On Diplomacy, published in 
1883, he used an animal metaphor: ‘from the ancient time until today, the way that countries 
fight each other is like that among beasts … As Japan is nothing but a country in the beast 
world, she will be eaten up by or will eat up other countries.’105 Therefore, he concluded, 
unless Japan learned from the European experience regarding the advancement of industry, 
commerce, and importantly military, Europeans would soon invade.106 His justification was: 
‘When [European nations] use violence, we must be violent too. When others use deceitful 
trickery, we must do likewise.’107 Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, Helen Hopper notes, 
Fukuzawa wrote and spoke relentlessly, underlining the urgency to draw equal to the West in 
military capacity and, thereby, helped to mould a public attitude of nationalism that supported 
Japan’s ventures in imperialism.108  
Japan could not then fight back the Europeans, but it could demonstrate military 
strength and thus its civilized position in world affairs through the ‘othering’ of its 
neighbouring countries. In 1882, in the very first issue of his newspaper Jiji Shinpo, 
Fukuzawa argued that while Japan was advancing on the road to civilization, Korea and 
China were falling behind and thereby risking European invasion. Thus Japan should, in its 
own interest, try to civilize these countries. Indeed, Fukuzawa involved himself in an 
attempted coup in Korea in 1884, guiding a key figure behind it, Kim Ok-Kyun. The failure 
of the coup and Kim’s flight to Japan left Fukuzawa with little hope for the modernization of 
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China and Korea.
109
 The following year, his famous article ‘On Departure from Asia’ (Datsu 
A-ron) explained why Japan should disassociate itself from uncivilized neighbouring 
countries and move towards the West.
110  China and Korea were destined for ruin and 
European invasion unless great leadership guided them towards civilization. Thus Japan’s 
policy should be to ‘lose no time in waiting for the enlightenment of our neighbouring 
countries in order to join them in developing Asia, but rather to depart from their rank and 
cast our lot with the civilized countries of the West. … Those with bad companions cannot 
avoid bad reputation. We must resolve to repudiate the bad companions of East Asia.’111  
How, then should Japan deal with these countries, which would nevertheless continue 
to be, geographically at least, neighbours? Fukuzawa, rather predictably, advised the 
Japanese authorities to deal with China and Korea ‘exactly as the Westerners do’112 and 
actively advocated for military intervention in Korea, as we shall see in the following section. 
He also supported the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which later offered Japan a free 
hand on Asian affairs.
113
 Thus, what initially appeared as ‘departure from Asia’ due to the 
backwardness of China and Korea, gradually paved the way for full-scale imperialism, with 
Japan guiding these ‘backward’ nations along the road to ‘civilization’. 
In this way, Fukuzawa’s initial engagement with the European standard of civilization 
within the framework of pragmatism and subsequent reinterpretation of ‘civilization’ as self-
defence fall in line with a long tradition of Japanese intellectual responses to dominant forces 
– be it Kokugaku (National Learning) reactions to Chinese ideological domination, or the 
propagation of kokutai (national-spirit) to the threat of Christianity. The Kokugaku and Mito 
scholars relied on the concepts of the Divine Kingdom, ancient Japanese Way, and unbroken 
Imperial lineage – all attributes of Japanese cultural superiority – to assert political 
dominance as a more civilized entity vis-a-vis other members of the Far Eastern regional 
order. Fukuzawa adopted the European notion of the ‘standard of civilization’ for the same 
purpose. However, frustration with European powers, shared by Fukuzawa and many of his 
contemporaries, regarding the unequal treatment of Japan despite its civilizational progress 
eventually made them question the very legitimacy of the ‘standard’ of European civilization, 
to the extent that to their mind imperialism itself appeared as the true standard of civilization. 
We turn to this construction of ‘civilization’ in the following section. 
 
4. BACK TO THE REGION: IMPERIALISM AS CIVILIZATION 
    
In 1887, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru’s policy was ‘Westernisation symbolised by balls and 
garden parties in the Rokumeikan that were designed as an aid to procuring treaty revisions 
from the Western powers’.114 As Itoo Hirobumi, a key political figure of the Meiji regime and 
the first prime minister of Japan, emphasized, Japan’s aim from the very beginning was to be 
considered a civilized nation and to become a member of the comity of European and 
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American nations,
115
 though it was never clear if Japan’s civilization would be recognized. 
Given that there was no fixed standard of civilization, Japan was subject to the changing 
interests and fears of the civilized nations.
116
 As Marius Jansen notes, ‘[e]quality and 
membership in the circle of great powers were not easily gained and when Meiji Japan 
thought itself ready to enter international politics’ on a basis of respect, ‘it proved to have 
more to learn’.117 Even sympathetic foreigners doubted whether any non-European people 
could establish a stable constitutional government of its own accord.
118
 When Hirobumi led a 
delegation to Europe in 1883 to study its various national constitutions, the Prussian jurist 
Rudolf von Gneist advised them that a nation requires a certain level of cultural advancement 
to create a truly meaningful constitution rather than merely ‘an elaborately embellished piece 
of paper’. Gneist indicated that ‘in Japan’s case the drafting of a constitution might very well 
be meaningless’.119    
Similarly, in Herbert Spencer’s view, Japan’s backwardness made the policies advised 
for Western societies unsuitable for Japan. He expressed this view to Arinori Mori and 
Kentaro Kaneko, influential figures within the Meiji government who became his friends.
120
 
Reflecting on his first discussion with Mori, about the reorganization of Japanese institutions, 
in 1873, Spencer wrote in his diary: ‘I gave him conservative advice – urging that they would 
have eventually to return to a form not much in advance of what they had and that they ought 
not attempt to diverge widely from it.’121 Contrary to his well-publicized position in favour of 
individual rights and more control on governments, his recommendation for Japan, therefore, 
was that ‘popular’ political power should be vested in the patriarchs, heads of families, or 
groups of families.
122
 Spencer hoped no one would notice this double standard.
123
  
As Ram Prakash Anand eloquently demonstrates, Meiji architects of modernization 
were equally aware of the inherent cultural bias of European international law that was 
instrumental for treaty renegotiation.
124
 After all, Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International 
Law (1836), the first book on international law to come to Japan – as a Chinese translation in 
1864 – defined this law as something ‘understood among civilized, Christian nations’; the 
precondition ‘Christian’ was deleted only in the third edition of 1846. 125  The racist 
underpinning of European international law was hardly overlooked by the Meiji politicians 
and thinkers.
126
 However, rather than unveiling their agitation about this European attitude, 
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the ruling elites of Japan continued to advocate Westernization and assimilation to become 
Europe’s equal, for they were not courageous enough to refute it ‘coldly and fearlessly’.127  
Japanese opposition parties demanded a unilateral denouncement of the unequal 
treaties,
128
 and they were finally renegotiated in 1894, with Britain abolishing 
extraterritoriality and special rights of foreign settlements; control over tariffs continued for 
another 12 years.
129
 This change took place against the backdrop of Japan’s increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis China and Korea: only Japan’s emergence as an imperial 
power signalled its ‘progress’ to the satisfaction of the West. Political and military elites in 
late-nineteenth-century Japan were convinced that imperialism equated civilization. As Erica 
Benner puts it, ‘it was no longer enough to have a modern constitution, industrializing 
economy, and system of mass education. An aspiring leading nation was now expected to 
have overseas colonies, increasingly subject to direct forms of control.’130 Thus, while the 
Charter Oath, issued immediately after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, indicated its apparent 
submission to the West,
131
 the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education was more nationalist, in 
line with the Kokugaku and Mito Schools of thought, mentioned earlier.
132
  
As we have seen, historically Japan’s claim to superiority, rhetorical as it sometimes 
was, was always defined in relation to subordinate Korea. By the 1870s, Japan had learned to 
translate cultural superiority into European-style imperial practices. Responding to a clash 
between Japanese surveying vessels and Korean coastal batteries in 1875, Japan sent several 
thousand troops to Korea to demand an apology, and more importantly, access to Korean 
ports. This Perry-style gunboat diplomacy resulted in the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1876, which 
opened three Korean ports to Japanese trade and gave permission for future coastal 
surveys.
133
 Undermining China’s longstanding influence, the treaty also declared Korea as an 
independent state with full sovereign rights. In mid-1894, an anti-foreign revolution broke out 
in Korea. The Korean king requested troops, and China sent them, but the Japanese 
reinforced their troops in Korea and took over the palace in Seoul. The war with China began 
in August that year.
134
 Japan won decisively.    
This war that signalled Japan’s emergence as a super power in Asia was extremely 
popular among the Japanese. People clamoured for all the news they could get about battles; 
newspapers sent war correspondents to the front. Fukuzawa’s newspaper Jiji Shinpo fed the 
excitement by publishing extra editions within the same day.
135
 For Fukuzawa himself, this 
war was ‘in reality a war between civilization and barbarism. Its result would decide the 
future of civilization. Accordingly, the Japanese who recognized themselves as the most 
progressive people of the East must be ready to fight not only for their country but also 
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civilization in the world.’136 It was a natural sequel to his Departure from Asia (Datsu A-ron) 
thesis. Hopper notes that Fukuzawa and other Meiji leaders justified the oppression of other 
Asian nations as a necessary step on the road to the national progress and development: ‘The 
fittest and strongest would survive, and, through the leadership of the more powerful, the 
weaker would eventually become civilized’.137 
Another writer, Sohoo Tokutomi (1863–1957), abandoned his liberal position during 
the war years. He thought that the European powers’ refusal to revise the unequal treaties 
despite its reforms and progress brought shame and dishonour to Japan. Despite being the 
‘most progressive, developed, civilised, and powerful nation in the Orient’ the Japanese could 
not escape ‘the scorn of the white people’, but Tokutomi argued that war could change 
that.
138
 For him, the international prestige that came with the victory over China 
demonstrated that ‘civilization is not a monopoly of the white man’, and the Japanese too had 
‘a character suitable for great achievements in the world.’139 He thought the Japanese must 
now capitalize their rediscovered strength to establish domination over their East Asian 
neighbours and bring civilization to this region under Japanese protection.
140
 Japan needed 
imperialism for self-defence.
141
   
Britain and the US endorsed this depiction of imperialism as civilization, largely for 
their own imperial convenience. Britain’s agenda was to prevent Russia from expanding its 
influence in East Asia; the United States intended to check Britain. US President Theodore 
Roosevelt even advocated for a Japanese version of the Monroe Doctrine.
142
 On 26 February 
1895, Charles Denby, as American Minister to Peking, reported to the State Department that: 
‘Of the two Oriental nations [i.e., Japan and China] which were opened to Western 
civilization by foreign guns, one accepted the results, the other rejected them. Japan is now 
doing for China what the United States did for Japan. She has learnt Western civilization and 
she is forcing it on her unwieldy neighbour. The only hope in the world for China is to take 
the lesson, rude as it is, to heart.’143  Similarly, following Japan’s victory, the American 
historian William Griffis praised Japan’s ‘unquenchable ambition to humble China, to 
impress the whole world, and to make their country great’ and, thereby, fuelled the belief that 
‘Japan’s credentials as the supremely civilised Asian nation authorised it to rescue its 
neighbours from their own backwardness, and hence from Western domination’.144 Likewise, 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty of 1902
145
 recognized that Japan was especially 
‘interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea’ 
and, thereby, offered Japan ‘a license to think in imperial terms’ with no limits established for 
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imperial ambition.
146
 With British protection, Japan was in a better position to deal with the 
Russian occupation of Manchuria in China. Following a full-scale war beginning in 1904, 
and ensuing mediation offered by the US President, Japan sealed its first-ever victory in a war 
against a European power in 1905.
147
  
Japanese scholar and art enthusiast Okakura Kakuzo (also known as Tenshin) (1863–
1913) also candidly depicted imperialism as civilization. His 1905 book The Awakening of 
Japan, written originally in English and published in London apparently for non-Japanese 
readers,
148
 recorded his frustration that Japan’s new constitutional government, educational 
system, reorganized military force and joining of the Geneva Convention, remodelled civil 
law code, and extensive commercial relations with the rest of the world were not enough to 
get the European powers to revise the obsolete treaties signed under the Tokugawa 
shogunate.
149
 Depicting these treaties as a ‘bitter drop’ in a ‘cup of happiness’, he continued:  
It was a hard task for us to convince the West that an Eastern nation could successfully assume the 
responsibilities of an enlightened people. It was not until our war with China in 1894–95 had revealed 
our military strength as well as our capacity to maintain a high standard of international morality that 
Europe consented to put an end to her extra-territorial jurisdiction in Japan. It is one of the painful 
lessons of history that civilization, in its progress, often climbs over the bodies of the slain.
150
  
In his more popular The Book of Tea, published a year later, he maintained: ‘He [the West] 
was wont to regard Japan as barbarous while she [the East] indulged in the gentle arts of 
peace: he calls her civilized since she began to commit wholesale slaughter on Manchurian 
battlefields.’151 Similarly, writing in 1907 the politician and journalist Takekoshi Yosaburoo 
portrayed Japanese imperialism as a source of pride, a symbol of equality with the West, and 
a contribution to modern civilization: ‘Western nations have long believed that on their 
shoulders alone rested the responsibility of colonizing the yet-unopened portions of the globe 
and extending to inhabitants the benefits of civilization; but now we Japanese, rising from the 
ocean in the extreme Orient, to take part in this great and glorious work.’152 
International lawyers played an active role from the very beginning of this imperial 
project. When fifty-four shipwrecked Ryukyans were murdered by the Taiwanese in 1874, 
Japan sent an expedition force to attack Taiwan. China protested, demanding their immediate 
withdrawal, but Japan, on the advice of the French Professor Gustav E. Boissonade justified 
the expedition under the theory of occupation of terra nullius. Citing Vattel, Martens, 
Heffter, and Bluntschli, Japan argued that territorial sovereignty over land could be 
recognized only where the state claiming it effectively exercised governmental functions, and 
that eastern Taiwan, where the Ryukyuans were killed, was outside the Chinese jurisdiction. 
Hence, the Japanese occupation did not infringe Chinese sovereignty under international law. 
China eventually agreed in the Peking Agreement (1874) that Japan’s enterprise was ‘a just 
and rightful proceeding to protect her own subjects’.153  
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Similarly, following the abolition of feudal clans in 1871, the Japanese imperial 
government placed the Ryukyu Islands – for centuries under the Sinocentric system a 
tributary state along with Japan – within the Kagoshima prefecture of Japan. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs took charge of foreign relations, including the conduct of treaties concluded 
between Ryukyu and other states, with Ryukyu continuing to send tributary missions to 
China.
154
 In the aftermath of the Taiwan expedition, Ryukyan affairs were transferred to the 
Ministry of the Interior in 1875, and Japan prohibited Ryukyan missions to China. When the 
Ryukyan officials resisted this order, arguing that Ryukyans consider both China and Japan 
their parents, Japan’s justification was the modern international law: ‘We … must change our 
old appearance completely, and everything should now be in accordance with the reason of 
the universe and the law of nations. The status of Ryukyu which has been subordinate to two 
states at the same time must be changed according to that reason and that law.”155  
During wars with China and Russia, Japan had two legal advisors, Sakue Takahashi 
for the Navy and Nagao Ariga for the Army, both professors at the Naval Academy and 
elsewhere. Their mandate was to observe the law of war ‘in the samurai spirit or according to 
the traditional spirit of brotherhood’.156 Both later published monographs157 demonstrating 
how Japan had incorporated European international law from the inception of its 
modernization and observed international law during the war, while China remained barbaric 
– killing non-combatants, destroying ships, offering a reward for the head of a Japanese 
general, engaging privateers to detain neutral merchant vessels, and killing prisoners, even 
sometimes hacking them to pieces.
158
 Takahashi contrasted ‘civilized’ Japan with ‘barbarous’ 
China and concluded that Japan had the right of reprisal.
159
 Likewise, Kanzo Uchimura 
depicted Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War as ‘the upward progress of the human 
race’ – free government, free religion, free education, and free commerce for 600,000,000 
souls in Asia and, therefore, the war itself as a ‘holy war’.160  These imperial wars thus 
justified Japan’s civilized position, as approved by European international lawyers161 and 
proved by its seat at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as a Great Power. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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Taken together, this story of Japan’s engagement with the nineteenth-century European 
notion of the standard of civilization against the backdrop of its longstanding practice of 
dealing with dominant forces in the regional context help us better understand the ideological 
structure of Japan’s engagement with European powers and also with its Asian neighbours. 
While Japan’s engagement with the nineteenth-century European idea of the standard of 
civilization took various forms – from self-defence to imperialism – the pattern of this 
engagement makes better sense in the context of Japanese responses to the pre-existing 
hierarchical regional order of the Far East. As we have seen, as part of a hegemonic regional 
order based on cultural superiority, Japan historically deconstructed and reconstructed the 
meaning of that cultural superiority. Japan accepted the dominance of China in the 
Confucianism-oriented Sinocentric regional order since the time of its first recorded 
history. Nevertheless, by the seventeenth century, Japan not only challenged China’s position 
as the centre of the universe but also gradually questioned the legitimacy of 
Confucianism, which was by then depicted as a foreign ideology. Japanese scholars 
developed their own nationalist logic of regional dominance based on the ancient Japanese 
Way of the Divine Kingdom and, with that, on the unbroken lineage of the Imperial family, 
to completely break with Chinese ideological hegemony. Also, faced with the emerging 
threat of European imperialism, early nineteenth-century scholars demonized Christianity and 
European civilization and advocated for a national-spirit (kokutai) by reinventing the ancient 
Way in line with National Learning.  
It is against this historical backdrop that following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese 
intellectuals gave the European idea of the standard of civilization various new meanings, in 
line with Japan’s military strength and political convenience. In Fukuzawa’s writings, 
‘civilization’ came to appear as a language of self-defence. He advocated for learning from 
Western civilization and setting it as the goal for Japan, but refrained from attributing any 
inherent value to it. He rather conceived of civilization within an instrumental framework of 
partisan, biased national interest: European civilization as the means of preserving 
independence, not as an end. The concept of civilization as self-defence morphed into the 
proposition that imperialism was civilization. What facilitated this shift was indeed the 
realization by the protagonists of Japanese modernization that their march 
towards civilization would not secure necessary recognition as a civilized nation 
from the West. This moment of frustration and uneasiness, often symbolized by the 
continuation of the unequal treaty regime despite Japan’s wholehearted 
Westernization, triggered more active persuasion of Western-style imperialism against 
neighbouring states. The political and military elites in the late-nineteenth century Japan were 
indeed convinced that imperialism equated civilization. This policy of imperial pursuits saw 
fruition as the Western powers finally agreed to renegotiate unequal treaties – only after 
Japan secured victory in an imperial war against China.  
In general, this contextualization of the nineteenth-century encounter between Europe 
and such an insular island-nation as Japan – within the framework of a pre-nineteenth century 
hierarchical regional order and the dynamic process of normative contestation therein – 
underscores the limits of Eurocentrism in international law scholarship. Recent efforts to 
acknowledge contributions of semi-peripheral elites to the development of international law 
since the mid-nineteenth century are therefore also limiting and do not fully break with 
23 
 
Eurocentrism, in that they explain such contributions essentially as responses to the European 
international legal order.
162
 Japan’s normative response to the nineteenth-century European 
civilization, or the development of Japanese international law ostensibly since then, or 
Japan’s imperialism towards its Asian neighbours later in that century – none of these took 
place in a vacuum. Far from being merely a result of the encounter with Europe in the mid-
nineteenth century, cultural hierarchy and hegemony have been omnipresent in the Far 
Eastern regional order, in which Japan engaged with its neighbours. While this paper does not 
claim any linear causal connection between any particular pre-modern Japanese ideology and 
Japanese imperialism since its modernization, we have however demonstrated that Japan’s 
relationship with Europe and its hegemony towards its neighbours was informed and shaped 
by a preexisting hierarchical order in the Far East.  
By highlighting not only rich varieties of rules and vocabularies governing 
international relations in the non-European world but also the hegemonic underpinning of 
those non-European orders, this narrative thus highlights the relevance of non-European 
regional orders in the discourse on international legal history but simultaneously exposes 
asymmetric power relations within those orders with reference to the local varieties of 
civilizational discourse. In this sense, this contextualization of the engagement with the 
nineteenth-century notion of the standard of civilization from Japanese perspectives raises a 
more general question about the inherent relationship between hegemony and international 
law. This also offers a framework for further research into the structures of other pre-colonial 
regional orders and the way they inform present-day regional asymmetric power relations. 
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